The importance of the tactical lessons for the Soviet armored forces drawn from the Spanish experience should not be exaggerated. Prior to the Polish and Finnish campaigns, Soviet studies of future tank warfare tended to employ examples from World War I tank fighting to establish combat norms, since the Spanish examples were on such a small scale. After the commitment of substantial Red army tank units to combat in Poland in September 1939, in the Far East at Khalkin Gol, and against Finland in December 1939, the focus shifted to lessons from these campaigns and the Spanish experience was pushed into the background. For example, during the 28 December 1940 meeting of the Military Council on the utilization of mechanized formations in contemporary offensive operations, chaired by Spanish Civil war veteran, Gen. Col. D. G. Pavlov, there was no mention of the Spanish experience while more recent campaigns involving armored vehicles including Lake Khasan, Poland, and Finland were discussed. t_o['F m4**~xfC If some tactical lessons from Spain had been appreciated and acted upon, many had not. Spain highlighted the lack of durability of tank designs of the 1930s and the need for expanded technical support within the armored units. This was not acted upon, due to inertia in the industrial ministries from the paralyzing effect of the purges as well as Army inaction and complacency. The level of spare parts availability remained chronically low, and the level of technical competence of the burgeoning officer cadres was inadequate. As a result, the technical status of the Soviet tank park reached appalling levels by the time of the war's outbreak in June 1941. The T-26 and BT tanks, which still made up the vast majority of the Red Army tank park, had engine reserves on average of only 75-100 hours and about 29% of all tanks were in need of capital overhaul, that is, factory rebuilding. The result was that in 1941, far more Soviet tanks were lost to mechanical breakdown during road marches than in combat. /NLui@|R ,BH@j%Jmy Calls for better training of tank crews also went largely unheeded. While the traditional view has held that the Red Army's poor performance in 1939-41 was due to the lingering effects of the purges, recent studies have begun to explore the broad range of difficulties of introducing novel technology and novel tactics into large armies dependent on conscripts and poorly trained reservists. In the 1941 campaign, Soviet tankers displayed a poor level of training and divisional records are replete with references to their inability to carry out simple functions such as driving the tank, operating the gun, or carrying out basic maintenance duties. \d6C%S! #jkf1"8 C Of critical importance to the viability of large mechanized formation, the issue of command and control went unaddressed. This was in part due to the backward state of Soviet radio technology compared to German or American radio technology at the time. Although steps were taken to develop a new generation of tactical radios durable enough for armored vehicle use, they were not generally available until well into the war years, and even then in small numbers. It is no surprise that one of Germany's prime architects of its armored force, Gen. Heinz Guderian, was a former signals officer. The importance of radios in particular, and command and control in general, remains one of the most inadequately studied issues of the development of armored warfare in the inter-war years. IbT=8l,Li urbp#G/> The single greatest failure of the Red Army in assessing the Spanish Civil War experience was in the area of tank-infantry cooperation. It is difficult to find any of the Soviet after-action reports from Spain that did not begin with the lament that "tank-infantry cooperation was poor". Soviet tankers held a very negative view of the average Spanish infantrymen, and this jaundiced view led them to discount the problem of tank-infantry cooperation, presuming that the situation would be better when operating with Red Army infantry. As was so evident in Finland in 1939-40 and in the opening phases of the war with Germany in the summer of 1941, this problem was not confined to Spain. The Red Army ignored institutional reforms to increase tank and infantry cooperative training and ignored the needs for improved communication between the tanks and infantry. 8L,5Q9
$ @P#N2:jwj If Soviet tanks were not prepared to cooperate with infantry in small-unit operations such as Spain, they were even more poorly prepared to conducted coordinated maneuvers during deep offensive operations. The Red Army's existing plans to employ trucks to transport infantry formations during deep operations was shortsighted given the poor cross-country capabilities of Soviet trucks of the late 1930s as would be so evident in the Finnish campaign of 1940. Attempts to move motorized infantry units forward in a timely fashion were frustrated by road congestion. While this was partly due to the severe weather conditions in Finland, it was exacerbated by the lack of cross-country capability of the Red Army trucks. Recognizing this problem, Germany at the time was developing its panzergrenadiers and the US Army its mechanized infantry battalions, using armored half-tracks capable of moving with the tanks. Infantry mechanization remained one of the singular failures of Red Army tactics in World War 2, and forced the adoption of wasteful and humanly-costly improvisations such as the use of tanks to transport troops into battle, so-called tank desant. The problems with tank-infantry cooperation in Spain could have acted as a catalyst to a debate on infantry mechanization, but the dilemma was not appreciated by the Red Army. vx1c,8 J=\HO8E6> While the professional ranks of the Red Army did not reject the important role of armored warfare on the future battlefield, far more conservative views were held by the post-Purge leadership of the army, made up of cronies of Stalin from the 1920 Russo-Polish war such as defense minister Klimenti Voroshilov. Voroshilov was skeptical of Tukhachevskiy's bold vision of deep battle and would have preferred to break up large mechanized formations and spread out their equipment to the rifle and cavalry divisions, thereby limiting their role to direct support. Voroshilov, and others in the army saw Spain as evidence of the difficulty of operating tanks, even in short range missions, and insisted on a larger role in maneuver warfare being played by horse cavalry. CNih6R Dt}JG6 S Voroshilov's opportunity to impose his view arose following the Soviet participation in the invasion of Poland on 17 September 1939. The performance of Soviet armored brigades in Poland was disappointing. The uncontested Polish invasion was the largest employment of Soviet armor until the outbreak of the war with Germany in 1941, and involved the use of two tank corps, seven independent tank brigades, four cavalry tank regiments and six infantry tank battalions, totaling 4,120 armored vehicles. Combat losses were miniscule, only 42 armored vehicles. Yet the armored force lost nearly ten percent of its vehicles in the first few days of moving into Poland due to mechanical breakdowns, ten times the level of combat losses. In a November 1939 meeting of the Military Council, Voroshilov advocated the dismantlement of the four tanks corps, and was supported in this effort by the head of the Auto-Tank Directorate (ABTU), Gen. Col. D. G. Pavlov. While Pavlov's support of Voroshilov's effort to trim the wings of the independent armored force has often been tied to his experience in Spain, the broader political context of this decision cannot be ignored, particularly the lingering effects of the Purge. Pavlov had no personal experience with large armored formations in Spain, never commanding a unit much large than a battalion. His own lack of success in achieving tactical breakthroughs using tanks in Spain may partly explain his skepticism of the use of large armored formations. But he also realized that supporting the view of Stalin's confidant, defense minister Voroshilov, was a prudent way to avoid an executioner's bullet, a fate which it should be recalled, befell his predecessor I. Khalepskiy. pV9IHs} `tBgH_$M One of the largely unheralded lessons of Spain was in the area of tank design. There was general satisfaction with the performance of the T-26 light tank. It was considered a robust and capable vehicle, and was especially appreciated in comparison with the dreadful Italian CV.3/35 tankette, the weakly armored and poorly armed German PzKpfw I light tank, and the Spanish army's old and worn-out Renault FT light tanks. Both of the Nationalist tank types were armed only with machine guns, and so could not defeat the T-26 in battle, and both were too thinly armored to resist the T-26's 45mm gun. The T-26 was so superior to the Italian tankettes and German light tanks that the Nationalist army offered a bounty of 500 pesetas for every example captured; the Moroccan troops showed a special talent in this regard. (/z_Q{"N FEW14U'O The T-26's design had taken place before the Red Army had developed any experience in tank combat and the fighting in Spain revealed some significant shortcomings that had not been foreseen by its designers. It's main failing was its poor armor, and immediate steps were taken to improve this through the introduction of sloped armor on the T-26S Model 1938. Its vision devices were completely inadequate in combat. When buttoned up, the crew was limited to small armored glass viewing slits, and in the case of the turret crew, a periscopic sight with a very limited viewing angle. The crews had an almost impossible time spotting enemy targets, especially the small anti-tank guns. So the crews tended to operate with the driver's hatch and the turret hatch open for adequate visibility. As a result, 75% of tank casualties were inflicted on crews through the open hatches. Trophies from the 1939 Polish campaign provided a partial solution, with the Red Army adopting copies of the Polish Gundlach tank periscope on future tank designs. x.]i}mt o*b] p- At the time of the Spanish Civil War, the Red Army was debating the requirements for its new cavalry tank to replace the BT fast tank and a new infantry tank to replace the T-26. The Auto-Armored Directorate defined a requirement that was a modest evolution of the BT with the same gun, but with slightly better armor and improved mobility. The requirement for the T-26 infantry tank replacement was similar, retaining the same 45mm gun, but improving the armor protection. The Red Army did not see the need for a revolutionary change in tank design, but this view was not shared by some of the tank design teams. )B
T 1#C4;3i, In early 1938, the design team from the Kharkov Locomotive Plant attended a meeting of the Military Council in Moscow in which the assistant commander for technical affairs of the International Tank Regiment, Aleksandr Vetrov, answered questions about his experiences in Spain, including both the Fuentes de Ebro battle and the fighting in Teruel. The design team came away from the meeting further reinforced in their view that the ABTU requirement was misbegotten and that the new fast tank should have thicker armor to protect it against anti-tank guns better than the German 37mm gun encountered in Spain, and should have a better gun than the old 45mm "sparrow-shooter" of the T-26 and BT. The resulting tank would emerge in 1940 as the T-34, a revolutionary design which would be the benchmark for world tank design through the first part of World War 2. The T-34 replaced both the BT and the T-26, since by a fluke of timing, the new T-50 infantry tank was delayed in development. By the time it finally did appear after the outbreak of the 1941 war, it was recognized to be too expensive and inferior to the T-34. So the T-34 was deployed instead to fulfill both roles. xe]y] ,kiv>{ Recent research on the origins of the T-34 design contradicts the widely held view that Soviet weapons design was a simple conveyor belt process, with the army developing the requirement based on its tactical doctrine, and the industrial ministries and design bureaus simply obeying and turning out a precise reflection of the Army's requirement document. Had the design bureau ignored the Spanish experience and followed the army requirements, the next generation Soviet tank would have been a mediocre design more akin to the British cruiser tanks of the period. The Kharkov design bureau's actions in this case displayed a hallmark trait of successful technological innovation in weapons design- the ability to see past the current threat and base the weapon on a projection of what the future threat would resemble. Organizationally, it was able to do so as the Soviet design bureau were given a surprising degree of latitude in the design process. Their small size did not foster to the type of paralysis that affected larger bureaucratic institutions of the Red Army, caused at the time by the Purge and the lack of consensus about the nature of future tank warfare. As a result, the tank engineers were able to use the lessons of the Spanish Civil War more effectively than the Red Army itself in assessing future technological needs. .8@$\ZRP rA3$3GLQ- The Spanish Civil War is regarded by many military historians as a testing ground for the weapons and tactics of the ensuing Second World War. However, some caution must be using in assessing the lessons of the conflicts. The significance of the war for armored warfare tactics has often been exaggerated, often based on misperceptions of the size of the armored forces employed and the goals of the forces involved. The Soviet-led tank units in Spain never attempted to prove or disprove theories of deep battle since the units involved were much too small to carry out such army-level or front-level operations. Nevertheless, Spain did provide a number of valuable lessons in the area of technology, training, and tactics, some of which were appreciated, many of which were not. WYH Q? D[4u+g?[}> Bibliographic Note tRs [ YK L5Ebc# The primary archival source for this article was a collection of documents obtained from the Russian State Military Archives (RGVA) by Yale University and currently housed at the Manuscript and Archives branch of Sterling Memorial Library. The Russian State Military Archive Collection (RSMAC-Group 1670) deals with Soviet-German Military collaboration in the 1920s and with Soviet military participation in the Spanish Civil War. About half of the Spanish Civil War collection consists of a variety of documents including daily reports from various advisers to Moscow, reports on unit actions, and studies on various subjects related to the fighting. The other half of the collection consists of the Soderzhanie Sbornika (Digest Collection), a special document collection prepared by the Red Army intelligence directorate for senior government and army officials and consisting of reports on key battles as well as special digests of reports on specific technical subjects such as tank operations, aircraft tactics, air defense technology in Spain and so on. For example, the Soderzhanie Sbornika No. 37 (Technical Notes on the actions of Republican Tanks in Spain) prepared in 1937 was printed in eight copies including copies for Stalin, defense minister Voroshilov, first deputy for defense Yegorov, foreign minister Molotov, and chief of staff Shapashnikov. The Yale Sbornik collection is not complete, missing a run of volumes from the summer of 1937. The bibliographic citations here refer to the Yale archives notations, not the original Russian archives, since according to Yale archivists, the Russian collection subsequently has been closed to western researchers. The author would like to thank Mary Habeck and the staff of the Manuscript and Archives division for their kind assistance on this project. Many of the other contemporary reports as well as pre-war editions of Voenniy Mysl and Voenno-istorichesskiy zhurnal were found in the collections of the Lehman Library, School of International Affairs, Columbia University. 8NxM4$nQX rV2WnAb[H& published in Journal of Slavic Military Studies Vol. 12 No. 3, Sep 1999 7S-ys+ L9r8BK; ㏒teven J. Zaloga 1999 ]s]vZ G/k2Pe{SL -f3p U:G8 lG9bLiFY Webeditor's note: The footnotes below were referenced by numbers in the text of the original publication. Because of HTML limitations, these numbers are absent here but will be restored as soon as possible. XeW<B0~ *T-<|zQ Spravka ob otpravke tankov i bronevikov v "X" za period s 12.10.36 7.5.37, (Russian State Military Archives Collection, Record Group 1670, Yale University Sterling Memorial Library), Box 13 (hereafter Yale RSMAC). The pretense that the Soviet tankers in Spain were volunteers was due to Soviet participation in the Non-Intervention Committee. David Cattell, Soviet Diplomacy and the Spanish Civil War, (Berkeley: Univ. of California Press, 1957). A#K14Ayr tClg*A;|B qz+dmef HguT"%iv During this period, the Red Army did not use traditional ranks but designations which referred to the role. So Kombrig (Komandir brygada-Brigade commander) was roughly equivalent of a colonel, Kompolk (regimental commander) a Lt. colonel, Kombat (Battalion commander) a major; Komrot (company commander) a captain; Komvzvod (Platoon commander) a lieutenant. In Spain, the Soviet officers sometimes used standard Western ranks to avoid confusion. B\=L3eL<D Vy6qbC-Kt A total of 9,532 T-26 were manufactured from 1931 to 1939. Vp#JS3Y 6@Y_*4$| _G[g;$< (]Z_UTT The Soviet 1929 field regulation PU-29 envisioned at least nine types of tanks, but by the mid-1930s, the Red Army had reduced this to five: the T-35 heavy (breakthrough) tanks, the T-28 medium tank; the T-26 infantry tank; the BT fast (cavalry) tank; and the T-37 amphibious reconnaissance tank. Dl<bnx;0 ~FZ&.<s l}a)ZeR1 lAS#874dE Krivoshein's pseudonym in Spain was Mele. The forward headquarters for the tank unit in the Madrid area was set up at Alcala de Henares. Krivoshein became one of the Red Army's most experienced tank commanders. After leaving Spain in early 1938, he commanded armor units in the Soviet Far East in the 1938 fighting with the Japanese Kwangtung Army at Lake Khasan (Nomonhon), commanded tanks again in the 1939-40 Finnish campaign, commanded the 1st Mechanized Corps during the German onslaught in June 1941, and ended up a senior commander during the Berlin operation in 1945. V_R@o3kv; u__9Z:+ 44gPCW,u F0pir(n- Arman's group is frequently referred to as a battalion in many accounts even though it was nowhere near battalion strength since his troops were intended to form the core of a Spanish tank battalion. P9GN}GN%v ]%hn`ZJ 35A|BD)q m!gz3u]rN Arman was his adopted name; he was born Paul Tilton and in Spain used the pseudonym Greisser. I. N. Shadkov, et. al., Geroi sovetskogo soyuza: kratkiy biograficheskiy slovar, Tom 1 (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1987), p. 75. RM]\+BK
zkt+7,vI :{PJI, NokU)O ;x V. Goloveshkin, "Dobrovotsi svobody", Znamenosets, No. 11, 1986, pp 18-19. R]vV* }{,^@xdyW @fHi\W2JG ;^*}#Xd Maksim Kolomiets and Ilya Moshchanskiy, "Tanki Ispanskoi respubliki", Tankomaster, No. 2-3 1998, p. 2. &4 {KV. v]'ztFA For example, in the case of the Renault FT, the most common and most advanced French tank of World War I, only 13 were lost to mines out of 440 lost in combat (<3%). Steven Zaloga, The Renault FT Light Tank, (London: Osprey, 1988), p. 21. )fFb_U RU'=ERYC |v`AA?@{8 -c_74c50 It is not clear whether the gasoline bottles were a spur-of-the-moment improvisation, or if the newspaper accounts of the arrival of Soviet tanks had prompted the Nationalists to prepare for possible infantry fighting with tanks. The use of these Molotov cocktails, so named after the Soviet foreign minister of the time, was a surprise to the Soviet tankers, and details of their construction were duly forwarded to Moscow. fX(3H1$" Umz KY ]}Mj)J" m AV:hBoO These tanks were manned by mixed Italian/Spanish crews and were part of the first detachment of Italian aid which had reached Spain in late September 1936. P. Caiti, A. Pirella, E. De Lia, "The Role of Italian Armor in the Spanish Civil War", Armor, May June 1986, p. 40. The Republican tank units seldom had much contact with the German Panzergruppe Drohne in Spain. For an account of German armor participation in Spain see: Raymond Surlemont, "German Tanks in Spain 1936-39", AFV News, Jan.-April 1992, pp. 13-14; Gen. F. M. Senger und Etterlin, "Sevilla 6. November 1936: Die Panzergruppe Thoma der "Legion Condor", der General de Pablo, der spanishche Burgerkrieg und die Folgen", Soldat und Technik, No. 10, 1986, pp. 584-588. %<)2/|lCd .?D7dyU l1 BHIRHmM<Y 68NYIyTW9 These claims come from Arman's report on the battle. Boevoy rabote respublikanskikh tankov v Ispanii (doklad major t. Arman), (Yale RSMAC, Box 14). ^?-:'<4q$ (lXGmx8 9/{(%XwX S{Kiy#ltWc George Hill, The Battle for Madrid, (London: Vantage Books, 1976), p. 85. SAH-p*. FTH|9OP &c` nR< ZXu>,Jy This included the newly formed 2nd Company commanded by A. Voynovskiy with a further 23 tanks, 6 BA-3 heavy armored cars and 3 FAI light armored cars, plus several of the other scattered units such as Novak's group. Doklad t. Krivosheina o boevoy rabote respublikanskikh tankov v Ispanii, (Yale RSMAC, Box 14). mf
A{3 [^R^8k %d1,a$*3} i{Uc6R6 The Spanish pre-war tank force had about 40 Renault FT light tanks, 4 derelict Schneider CA.1 tanks, and 26 locally produced Trubia Model 1926 tanks. The Spanish tank force had seen combat in the Rif War in the 1920s. Javier de Mazarrasa, Los Carros de Combate en Espana, (Madrid: Ed. San Martin, 1977). Francisco Fernandez Mateos, "Carros de Combate y Vehiculos Acorazados en la Historia de Espana" Special supplement to Revista Ejercito, 1984. Jose Alvarez, "Tank Warfare during the Rif Rebellion 1921-27", Armor, January-February 1997, pp. 26-28. |!1Y*|Q%s QHDXW1+|^ yd^{tQi &x=.$76 Report from "Sancho" to "Direktor", 5 April 1937, Predstavlyayu kratkiy otchet o rabote Madridskoy gruppy za vremya noyabr 1936g.-mart 1937g. (Yale RSMAC, Box 9) m.JBOq= v6[!o<@"a 7yG#Z)VE \<&m&%Zs Col. N. P. Zolotov, "Boegotovy byli…Istoriko-statisticheskoe issledovanie kolichestvenno-kachestvennogo tankovogo parka Krasnoy Armii nakanune VOV", Voenno-Istorichesskiy Zhurnal, No. 11, 199, p. 76. The heavy maintenance demands of these tanks is evident from the operators manual: Materialnaya, vozhdenie, ukhod i regulirovka tanka T-26, (Moscow: Ministry of Defense, 1934). 7G:s2432 uX"H4lO~ "$~':) V" )s)I2Z+ Plan o predzaritelnikh ktogakh opyta voiny v Ispanii, 10.3.37, (Yale RSMAC, Box 10). A day-by-day account of Arman's tank operations can be found in: Svatopluk Spurny, "T-26", HPM, No. 12, 1997, pp. 24-26. dWM'fg
d:_t-ZZo szb_*)k sz5MH!/PJ The Bolsheviks had very little practical experience operating tanks in the Russian Civil War. Steven Zaloga and James Grandsen, Soviet Tanks and Combat Vehicles of World War Two, (London: Arms & Armour Press, 1984), pp. 27-33. In 1929, a small detachment of T-18 light tanks were used for a few days of fighting with Chinese warlord forces along the Chinese Eastern Rail Line (KVZhD). M. Svirin, A Beskurnikov, Pervye sovetskie tanki, (Moscow: Armada, 1995), pp. 50-52. S(o#K|)> .\\DKh% % "kPvI3Y FGPB: This practice had begun in World War I for the same reason, namely the low endurance of early tanks and the need to carefully reserve their running hours for actual combat missions. The French army began by using semi-trailers for the tanks, later switching to heavy trucks as they became available. The same practice is widely used in many army's today since the operating costs for a tank transporter are far lower than those for a tank. Jean-Michel Boniface, Jean-Gabriel Jeudy, Les Camions de la Victoire, (Paris: Editions Massin, 1996). 9"@\s$
OBk [8.c8-lZ^ N/[p < 6}Vf\j~ Arman met with the senior members of the Military Council including Voroshilov, Gamarnik, and Tukhachevskiy on 16 January 1937. Zapis priema u t. Voroshilova 16 Yanuarya 1937g., (Yale RSMAC, Box 9). >Y&N8PHD kj|6iG .4_o>D rR$h* A. A. Shukhardin, "Tankovaya brigada zashcishchayet Madrid", in: My-internatsionality, vospominaniya sov. dobrovoltsev-uchastnikov nats. rev. voyny v Ispanii. (Moscow: Politizdat, 1975), pp. 73-85. z
F_M*8= \(J8#V 5 z~1Dw $Ad{Z A Red Army light tank brigade at the time had a strength of 256-267 tanks, organized into four tank battalions, and supported by a motor transport battalion and a maintenance battalion. Pavlov's brigade was organized around three instead of four tank battalions, a planned but never completed machine gun battalion, an enlarged transport battalion, and special factory support, technical repair, medical and food supplies departments. Skhema tankovoy brigady Ispanskoy respublikanskoy armii (Yale RSMAC, Box 14) At the time that Pavlov's brigade went into operation in January 1937, it had received only 56 new tanks since the original October shipment bringing the total to date to 106. Bp*K]3_ ,oORW/0iS 2`AY~i9 Z_PNI#h* The T-26 had a crew of three: driver, gunner and tank commander. @D)al^]x6 CHdX;'`* 6h>wt-tRC 8&;UO{ The unit's strength was 56 T-26 tanks if vehicles under overhaul and training vehicles were counted. K#l:wH_ }elc `jj a:+{f& gMv.V{vD Doklad Komkor tov. Kulik, Operativno-takticheskiy opyt voyny v Ispanii (Boevye deystviya na tsentralnom fronte v period s oktyabr 1936g. po fevral 1937g.): Operatsiya myateznikov pod Makhadaonda i Las Rosas s 3.1 po 14. 1 37 i kontrudar respublikantsev ot Eskorial, (Yale RSMAC, Box 15, p. 58.) a[v0%W ]u efSM`!%j q?,).x
nN ZWii)0'PV Soderzhanie Sbornika No. 9: Zapiski uchastnikov tankovikh boev u Makhadaonda 11-12 yanvarya 1937 g. (Yale RSMAC, Box 14) W$QcDp]#p} ~{*7"o/ G
!<Z.] +ylTGSZS Letter from Goratsi to Direktor, 19 March 1937, Otchet o Khoramskoy operatsii, (Yale RSMAC, Box 9). =Ee&da^MB !ds"9w This particular mission was cited in the Red Army General Staff study as a good example of tanks in defensive operations. The tanks had been kept in reserve until needed, and then committed with clear objectives. S. Lyubarskiy, Nekotorye operativno-takticheskie vyvody iz opyta voyna v Ispanii, (Moscow: Academy of the General Staff of the RKKA, 1939), p. 21. ZufR{^W /Y*WBTV' JHW"-b 1 da@3xaF Doklad Komkor tov. Kulik: Operativno-takticheskiy opyt voyny v Ispanii (Boevye deystviya na tsentralnom fronte v period s oktyabr 1936g. po fevral 1937g.): Kharamskaya operatsiya. (Yale RSMAC Box 15) p. 88. 4]rnY~ JBD7h5|Lc 'UkxS b _geWE0
E Rudoft's identity has not been clarified to date; he may have been a later victim of the Purge. Pavlov remained in the Soviet Union and was assigned as head of the Auto-Tank Directorate. zUDg&-J3 BmBj7 There are some discrepancies about the total number of tanks delivered to Spain. Most Russian sources quote a figure of 347 tanks (297 T-26 and 50 BT-5) while others quote figures as high as 362 tanks. However, recent archival evidence would suggest that the figure is lower, only 331 tanks. The various discrepancies were probably caused by one of several events. On its second voyage to Spain, the transport ship Komsomol was sunk by the Spanish cruiser Canarias on 14 December 1936, probably carrying tanks that may have been counted in some of the totals. An attempted shipment of 25 T-26 tanks on the transport Iciar in the summer of 1937 was blocked when the crew refused to sail. Finally, there was at least one shipment of 40 T-26 tanks that was returned to the USSR late in the war. The figures of 347 and 362 tanks probably refer to the number of tanks shipped, while the figure of 331 tanks is the number of tanks actually delivered to Spain. Spravka ob otpravke tankov i bronevikov v "X" za period s 12.10.36-7.5.37 (Yale RSMAC, Box 13); Gerald Howson, Arms for Spain: The Untold Story of the Spanish Civil War, London: John Murray, 1998). Hh%I0# 'QG xd!4 &d9{k5/+\ _G_Cj{w Antony Beevor, The Spanish Civil War, (London: Peter Bedrick), p. 197. Y}@&h! rJd,Rdt. A. G. Serebyakov, "Brunetskaya operatsiya v Ispanii (5.7-27.7.37 g.)", Voenniy Mysl, No. 2, 1940, pp. 99-111; I. Ratner, "Brunetskaya operatsiya (1937g.)", Voenno-istorichesskiy zhurnal, No. 1, 1941, pp. 11-31. R7]l{2V#^ 9Q
-HeXvR yxonRV$& KMt`XaC9e This was according to an American volunteer tanker in the 5th Tank Battalion at the battle, Robert Gladnick. Cecil Eby, Between the Bullet and the Lie: American Volunteers in the Spanish Civil War, (New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1969)pp. 129-130. +QB"8- t^VwR=i The brigade had suffered 8 tanks burned out, and 51 others knocked out including 25 hit by anti-tank guns or other artillery and 26 by other means. Many of these were recoverable, but not in time to continue with the Brunete fighting. Casualties had been 29 dead and 103 wounded, the equivalent of 44 tank crews. The force on 11-12 July consisted of 13 tanks attached to Lister's 11th Division, 12 to Gal's 15th Division, and the remainder in reserve. Ramon Salas Larrazabal, Historia Ejercito Popular de la Republica, Vol. 2, (Madrid: Editora Nacional, 1973), p. 1255. +~St !QV% > pgX^ \/E>4)MD y Y4%:7mw~= J. P. Harris, Men, Ideas and Tanks: British military thought and armoured forces, 1913-1939, (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1995), p. 292. i}b${no pEw"8U lNNv|YiL 2^XGGB0 A. D. Harvey, "The Spanish Civil War as Seen by British officers", RUSI Journal, August 1996, p. 66. +[Dj5~V ioaU*% Serebyakov and Ratner, op. cit. S,D8F&bg ~)*,S^k(C. Lyubarskiy, op. cit., p. 46. 1ofKt=|= Pl(Q,e7O] gwNq
x" @<<<C?CTv One of the most prolific Russian writers on tank operations in Spain was Aleksandr Vetrov, Kondryatev's assistant commander for technical affairs. He published numerous articles on the subject and at least two books, one of which is his memoirs of the regiment's fighting in Spain. Aleksandr Vetrov, Volontery svobody: vospominaniya uchastnika natsionalno-revolyutsionoy voyny v Ispanii, (Moscow: Politicheskoy Literatury, 1972). Twh!X*uQ ^m
L@e'r 909?_v ;1#H62Z* In general, Spanish tankers were used as tank turret crews, both commanders and gunners. In following the practice of earlier units in Spain, most of the regiment's drivers were Soviet tankers as were all company commanders and higher staff. International Brigade tankers were usually tank commanders. Report on the Combat Use on the 13th of October (1937) of the Regiment of BT-5 Tanks by Robert Gladnick, Commander of Tank #7, 1st Section, 1st Company, (Yale RSMAC, Box 14). OL5v).Bb ?8HHA:GP gep;{G} y@]_+2Vo Sanobespechenie tankovoy brigady i polka BT vo vtoroj Saragosskoy operatsii s 11.10 po 13.10.37 g (Yale RSMAC, Box 16) <|e,05aM du+y5dw }L
&^xe T _M!<J Report on the Combat Use on the 13th of October (1937) of the Regiment of BT-5 Tanks by Robert Gladnick, Commander of Tank #7, 1st Section, 1st Company, (Yale RSMAC, Box 14). W"724fwu& J2d.f}- agkA}O =6xrfDbN8 Soderzhanie Sbornika No. 57: Pismo ob itogakh Saragosskoj operatsii komdiv 35 tov. Walter, 14 October 1937, (Yale RSMAC, Box 16). The details of the attack were approved by the Soviet advisers to Army of the North, as the instructions for the attack were handed over to Kondryatev by advisers Grigoriev and Leonidov, as well as the front's chief of staff, Lt. Col. Cordon. yH7F''O7 #XK2Ien)Z 1h(0IjG8 X$%' Besides the extensive Soviet coverage, which can be found in abundance in the Yale collection, there are numerous accounts of the battle from many other perspectives in English since the accompanying infantry units were from British International Brigade formations. For example see: Ian MacDougall, Voices from the Spanish Civil War: Personal recollections of Scottish Volunteers in Republican Spain 1936-39, (Edinburgh: Polygon, 1986), pp. 214-218. ?=>+LqP D@C-5rmq Their nominal organization was two armored brigades, an infantry brigade, and a company of anti-tank guns. In fact, the infantry was seldom available and their tank strength steadily declined. }{M#EP8q+ ,"2s` YC z+x\(/ >AC]#' The Nationalists also attempted to produce tanks during the war, with little success. Javier de Mazarrasa, El Carro de combate Verdeja, (Madrid: Ed. Carbonell, 1988). :#2Bw]z&z BW-`t-,E; -\+s#kE: /{|EAd{ F. C. Albert, Carros de combate y vehiculos blindados de la guerra 1936-1939, (Barcelona: Borras Ediciones, 1984). CF&NFSti^ UsgK Katalonskaya Operatsiya 23.12.38-9.2.39 (Yale RSMAC, Box 13). YTAmgkF\4 })uGRvz ;V@WtZv |b[+I?X Teruelskaya Operatsiya 15.12.1937-23.2.1938, (Yale RSMAC, Box 9), p. 59. :WQ^j!9' ;sfb 4x4 ~a%Z;Aj 0,r}o To make up for the lack of Soviet spare parts, Spanish industry produced almost 20 tons of spare tank parts, including track, wheels, and other components. Kratkiy doklad starshego voennogo sovietnik Komdiv tov. Shtern o voennom polozhenii v. Ispanii, 5.10.37 (Yale RSMAC, Box 17). 7ByTnYe~S +nUy,S?43 J5*tJoCYS DvME1]7) A. D. Harvey, "The Spanish Civil War as Seen by British officers", RUSI Journal, August 1996, p. 66. 8 m5p_\& z25lZI" X` Q)"C&)`l QFfK0X8cC John Erickson, The Soviet High Command: A Military Political History 1918-1941, (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1984), p. 474. 4B=2>k KuWWUjCE Takticheskie zadaniya po provedeniyu opytov v "X" (Yale RSMAC, Box 10). WegtyO Yaj0;Lo[wt This unit was also called the Regimento de Carros Pesados (Heavy Tank Regiment) by the Spanish. n-5W*zk1 -8'C\R|J+ "The Use of Tanks in Combat under the Provisions of the Field Service Regulations of 1936, Zhurnal avtobronetankovykh voysk, April 1937. An English translation of this article is available in the report from the US Military Attach?to Moscow, LTC. P. R. Faymonville to the US Army Military Intelligence Division of 26 May 1937 (MID Report 2037-1972-42) and as an enclosure in MID Report 2037-1972-45. =b38(\
h1:aKm! Most of these appeared in the journal Voenniy Mysl: P. Korkodinov, "Ognevoe obespechnie ataki tankov DD", (No. 8-9, 1937); A. Ignatev, "Pekhota i tanki v nastupatelnom boyu" (No. 1, 1938); N. Krasitskiy, "Upravlenie bronetankovym soedineniem pri razvitii proryva", (No. 10, 1939), K. Skorobogatkin, "Boy tankov protiv tankov", (No. 10, 1939). aHlcfh9|
rL/H2[d An interesting discussion of this problem can be found in a recent assessment of German vs. British tank fighting in North Africa. Tom Jentz, Tank Combat in North Africa: The Opening Rounds, (Atglen, PA: Schiffer, 1997). ygOd69 $`APHjijN Mc#*wEo)8 Ok>gh2e[c The early 71-TK tank radios could use voice communication at shorter ranges, but over a few kilometers, the only reliable means of communication was by code. Before each major engagement, a list of coded numerical abbreviations were provided to the tank units, but these were inflexible and difficult to employ. sLh==V;9 2#o>Z4 r{ Initial installments of this study were published in Voenniy Mysl in 1938, and an amplified version was completed in 1939. S. Lyubarskiy, "Nekotorye vyvody iz opyta voyny v Ispanii", Voenniy Mysl, No. 10, 1938, pp. 12-25. S. Lyubarskiy, "Nekotorye vyvody iz opyta voyny v Ispanii: Oboronoa", Voenniy Mysl, No. 11, 1938, pp. 26-31. S. Lyubarskiy, Nekotorye operativno-takticheskie vyvody iz opyta voyny v Ispanii, (Moscow: Academy of the General Staff of the RKKA, 1939). pqUCqo!m\ W8Q|$ZJ88F Indeed, the study was forced to draw on weak examples such as the company-size raid by Arman's group on Sesena in October 1936 and two company-sized operations by the Nationalist Foreign Legion tank battalion in 1938 as some of the only cases to hint at the use of armor in deep offensive tactics. R=.4 ,PlO8;5] ?MXejEC 4!$s}V=6 I. A. Korotkov, Istoriya sovetskoy voennoy mysli: Kratkiy ocherk 1917-iun 1941, (Moscow: Nauka, 1980) pp. 106-107 nv)2!mAh\ NxSu3e~PS For example, in assessing tank losses during offensive operations, and examining the role of tanks in the operational arts, World War I examples formed the basis for establishing norms. G. Sedukov, "Poteri tankov pri nastuplenii", Voenniy Mysl, No.7, 1939, pp. 134-143. K. Stepnoy, "Tanki i operativnoe iskusstvo", Voenniy Mysl, No. 1, 1937, pp. 28-45. "mX\&%i6\p :z}MIuf Ispolzovanie mekh. soedineniy v sovremennoy nastupatelnoy operatsii i vvod mekh. korpusa v proryv, (Stenogram transcript of the 28 December 1940 meeting of the Military Council chaired by Gen. Col. D. G. Pavlov; microfiche copy at Lehman Library, School of International Affairs, Columbia University. *Kyw^DI %509\;el .b\$MZ"( F1 iGMf-8 V. A. Anfilov, Dorogo k tragedii: sorok pervogo goda, (Moscow: Akopov, 1997), p. 102. 6W@UJx}w5 #G|qD & +4gSr Tskq)NU The surviving records of the 1941 tank divisions on this matter are contained in: Sbornik boevykh dokumentov Velikoy Otchesvennoy Voyny, Vypusk 33, (Moscow: Military Scientific Directorate of the General Staff, 1957). ^?$WVB )q0. 0<f P-`M pkP?i5, Roger R. Reese, Stalin's Reluctant Soldiers: A Social history of the Red Army 1925-41, (Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 1996). An equally illuminating study of another army which had difficulty in absorbing the new technology is: Eugenia Kiesling, Arming Against Hitler: France & the Limits of Military Planning, (Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 1996). ur*T%b9& OQ8 bI=?[x Carl Van Dyke, The Soviet Invasion of Finland 1939-40, (London: Frank Cass, 1997) m7&O9?X AGH|"EWG -yR.<KnL qs|mj}? The only comprehensive study of Soviet use of armor in Poland based on archival records is: Janusz Magnuski and Maksim Kolomiets, Czerwony Blitzkrieg, (Warsaw: Pelta, 1994). C(S'#cm [qdRUV' The Nationalists captured between 30 and 60 Soviet tanks during the war, managing to form at least two companies of tanks in the two Spanish Foreign Legion tank battalions. |M8WyW kR]!Vr*yh t(GR)&>.2 dX\.t< Komdiv Orlov, Assistant Director for Intelligence, RKKA Command, December 1938, to defense minister Voroshilov ktnuNsp x? ?pBhJH K6y :mJYp\ W-Fu -Cz= Sbornik No. 113: Predstavlyayu kratkie zamechaniy polkovnika tov. Terekhina o deistviyakh tankov v Ispanii.(Yale RSMAC, Box 18), p. 19. {)DHH:n /V=24\1Ky }>)@WL:q ~CtL9m3tO A. A. Vetrov, Tak i bylo, (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1982). ";BlIovT=R
x8!ol2\`< M. D. Borisyuk, Kharkovskoe konstruktorskoe byuro po mashinostroeniyu im. A. A. Morozova, (Kharkov: KhKBM, 1997). p7);uF^O% $=5=NuX Av?2< tS|9fBdCs Steven Zaloga, "Technological Surprise and the Initial Period of War: The Case of the T-34 Tank in 1941", Journal of Slavic Military Studies, Vol. 6 No. 4, December 1993, pp. 634-646. Steven Zaloga, The T-34/76 Medium Tank 1941-45, (London: Osprey, 1994). R E}?5XHb QF-LU ,\X@~j 1?)Xp|O This continued to be the case in the post-World War 2 period, where most of the key innovations in tank design were on the initiative of the design bureaus, not the army. A. Hull, D. Markov and S. Zaloga, Soviet/Russian Armor and Artillery Design Practices: 1945-1995 (Quantico, VA: US Marine Corps Intelligence Activity, 1996; MCIA-1141-001-96 Unclassified) |